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1 Introduction
How do interest rate rules perform under credit market imperfections? Are their stabilization
properties the same as in the frictionless case?
Recent evidence shows that central banks in most industrialized countries use the nominal
interest rate as their monetary policy instrument, following a sort of rule to reduce the volatility
of in‡ation and/or output (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998)). The impact of these “Taylor
rules” has mainly been modeled under the assumption of perfect credit markets. However,
credit markets are far from perfect. Since a credit contract involves the unknown future, there
is typically one part of the contract (usually borrowers) with more information about its own
performance than the other (lenders). This private information enjoyed by borrowers may be
re‡ected in the interest rate characterizing the contract, to the extent that it may explain the
di¤erences in …nancing between small and large …rms (Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), and (1995)).
Figure 1 reports the evolution of the spread between the Bank Prime rate and the three-
month commercial paper rate for the period 1971:2-1997:3, together with real GNP for the same
period. During this time, the average spread is positive (191 basis points), implying a risk
premium paid by borrowers. Also, the chart clearly shows the countercyclical character of this
spread, which has a correlation with GNP of ¡0:33 in the sample. We could interpret this as
evidence that …nancial imperfections diminish in good times and increase in booms. Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) argue that such time-varying imperfections may help amplify the
movements in output. If this is the case, then studying the performance of stabilization policy
while abstracting from credit frictions might be misleading, and an adequate model for this
analysis should re‡ect the dynamics of the risk premium.
In this paper I investigate the performance of monetary policy governed by interest rate rules
in economies with and without credit market imperfections. Money will have real e¤ects in the
model, because I assume limited participation of households in …nancial markets. Credit market
frictions are introduced through asymmetric information in the production of capital. In this
context, I study the e¤ects of shocks to technology and to government spending, comparing the
implications of two policy rules: an exogenous constant money growth rule, and a Taylor rule.
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The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, by including interest rate rules and credit
market imperfections in a limited participation setup I obtain a framework which is well-suited
to address the interaction of frictions and monetary policy instruments, but which yields very
di¤erent implications from new Keynesian models. Second, the model’s capability to account for
some stylized facts in business cycles dynamics is quantitatively analyzed. And third, comparing
Taylor-type rules to the case of constant money growth, this framework is used to analyze the
stabilization properties of monetary policy.
The main results can be summarized as follows. Introducing credit market imperfections
enables the model to replicate the negative correlation between output and the risk premium,
and signi…cantly increases the ampli…cation of shocks. I also …nd that in a limited participation
setup, interest rate rules have the opposite stabilization e¤ects when compared with a sticky
price setting. Furthermore, a Taylor rule has stronger e¤ects, either stabilizing or destabilizing,
when there are credit market imperfections. Finally, while stabilizing the economy’s response to
technology shocks is counterproductive if …nancial markets are frictionless, when there are credit
market imperfections I …nd that using a stabilizing interest rate rule can bring the economy closer
to its frictionless optimum.
The following section brie‡y discusses related literature. Thereafter, Section 2 develops the
model, Section 3 de…nes the equilibrium, and Section 4 speci…es parameters. Section 5 studies the
model’s second moments and impulse responses. The interaction of credit market imperfections
and interest rate rules is analyzed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
1.1 Related literature
Fuerst (1995) investigates whether the presence of …nancial frictions alters the e¤ects of tech-
nology and monetary shocks. His model economy is also a limited participation setup in which
credit market imperfections arise in the production of capital goods, but his analysis di¤ers from
mine in some key points. He restricts monetary policy to a constant money growth rule. Also,
he does not …nd signi…cant ampli…cation or propagation from …nancial frictions, and his model
fails to replicate the observed negative correlation between output and the risk premium.
In a comment on Fuerst’s paper, Gertler (1995) highlights the crucial role of the elasticity of
net worth with respect to output in this type of analysis. Since pro…ts and cash ‡ow and hence
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entrepreneurs’ net worth show a high positive elasticity with respect to output growth, the need
for external …nancing and the cost of external funds fall substantially during booms. This helps
replicate the negative correlation between output and the risk premium observed in the data,
and implies a positive feedback on output that can be quantitatively important if net worth is
su¢ciently elastic. I internalize this fact in my analysis and obtain signi…cant ampli…cation and
persistence from credit market imperfections.
Much of the rest of the literature assumes a New Keynesian structure, like Bernanke et
al. (2000), who study credit imperfections a¤ecting capital demand in a sticky-price model.
These new Keynesian models contrast sharply with mine, because they predict that the use of
interest rate rules stabilizes the economy’s response to aggregate demand shocks. This follows
from the assumption of nominal rigidities and demand-determined output, which imply that
distortions arising from the demand side can be neutralized by changing the money supply (that
is, by using the interest rate as an instrument). In contrast, given the limited participation
setup assumed here, output becomes supply-determined and aggregate demand is left the role of
determining the price level. This implies that shocks a¤ecting aggregate supply can be stabilized
by manipulating the interest rate, whereas a tradeo¤ between output and in‡ation stabilization
arises when demand shocks are considered.
2 The model
The model is a cash-in-advance economy with two additional frictions. The …rst one allows
for the nonneutral e¤ects of money by assuming limited participation of households in …nancial
markets. The second one introduces credit market imperfections in the production of capital.
The economy is composed of households, …rms, …nancial intermediaries, a monetary authority,
a …scal authority and entrepreneurs.
The households, …rms, and …nancial intermediaries in the economy are assumed to belong
to a family. This family splits early in the morning to play separate roles. At the end of the
day, they all gather and share all their earnings.
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2.1 Households
There is a continuum of in…nite-lived households in the interval [0,1]. The representative house-
hold chooses contingency plans for consumption (Ct), labor supply (Lt); and deposits1 (
_
Dt),
taking as given the sequence of prices and quantities f
_
P t;
_
W t;
_
M t; Rt;
_
¦
f
t ;
_
¦
fi
t g1t=0 to solve
max
Ct;Lt;
_
Dt
E0
1X
t=0
¯t
Ã
C1¡µt ¡ 1
1¡ µ ¡ª
L1+Ãt
1 + Ã
!
; (1)
subject to
_
M t ¡
_
Dt + ¹WtLt ¸
_
P tCt; (2)
_
M t+1 =
_
M t ¡
_
Dt +
_
W tLt ¡
_
P tCt +Rt
_
Dt +
_
¦
f
t +
_
¦
fi
t ¡ ¹PtTt: (3)
Here E0 denotes expectations conditional on time 0 information, ¯ 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor,
the constant µ denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption, Ã is the inverse
of the elasticity of labor supply with respect to real wages, and ª is a scale parameter.
The representative household begins time t with money holdings from the previous period,
_
M t. A fraction of these money holdings is allocated to deposits in the bank,
_
Dt: Additionally, he
supplies labor to …rms and receives in return wage payments,
_
W tLt, that can be spent within the
same period. This wage income plus money holdings minus deposits is available for consumption
purchases,
_
P tCt, as re‡ected in the cash-in-advance constraint (2).
The ‡ow of money from period t to period t+1 is given by (3), which shows two additional
income sources at the end of period t. The household obtains interest plus principal on deposits
from the …nancial intermediary, Rt
_
Dt; where Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate; and
also dividends
_
¦
f
t from the …rm, and
_
¦
fi
t from the …nancial intermediary. Finally, he must pay
lump-sum taxes, Tt; that …nance government spending.
The optimal labor-leisure and deposits decisions are
UC;t
¹Pt
= ¡UL;t¹Wt ; (4)
Et¡1
µ
UL;t
¹Wt
¶
= ¯Et¡1
µ
UL;t+1Rt
¹Wt+1
¶
; (5)
1Henceforth, upper bar letters will indicate nominal variables not normalized. Plain upper case letters will
denote nominal variables once normalized. And lower case letters will refer to the growth rates of variables.
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where UC and UL denote the marginal utility of consumption and disutility of labor, respectively.
Equation (5) is equivalent to the Fisher equation in other monetary models, except that
expectations depend on the information set at t¡ 1; re‡ecting households’ limited participation
in …nancial markets. That is, households make their portfolio choices before time t shocks are
revealed, and cannot adjust their deposits again until the next period. This rigidity induces
the liquidity e¤ect of a money supply shock on the nominal interest rate observed in the data,
because …rms are the only agents able to absorb the excess liquidity in the economy after a
monetary injection. The central bank achieves money market clearing by reducing the interest
rate so that …rms are willing to borrow the excess amount of funds (see Lucas (1990), Christiano
(1991), Fuerst (1992), and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997)).
2.2 Firms
Firms produce a homogeneous good in a competitive framework. They hire labor from house-
holds, and purchase capital, as inputs for production. Firms own no initial funds, so they must
borrow at the beginning of every period to pay the wage bill and current capital purchases. The
production function takes the form
Yt = F (At;Kt; Ht) = AtK
®k
t H
®h
t ; (6)
where Ht denotes the demand for household’s labor, and Kt is capital needed for production. I
assume that ®k + ®h = 1, re‡ecting constant returns to scale in technology. The variable At is
the technological shock, modeled by a …rst order Markov process
At+1 = exp("a;t+1)A
½a
t ; (7)
with 0 < ½a < 1; and "a;t+1 is an i.i.d. normal shock with zero mean and standard deviation ¾
"
a:
The borrowing decision of …rms is subject to the following cash-in-advance constraint:
_
B
d
t ¸
_
W tHt +
_
P tQtZ
d
t ; (8)
where
_
B
d
t denotes the demand for loans from the bank;
_
W t is households’ wages; Qt is the
capital goods price in consumption goods units, and Zdt denotes the new investment purchased
each period (investment demand).
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Firms buy additional units of investment goods, Zdt ; in competitive markets that open at the
end of the period and involve …rms buying capital from entrepreneurs, described below. Firms
accumulate capital according to the following law of motion:
Zdt = Kt+1 ¡ (1¡ ±)Kt; (9)
where ± is the depreciation rate of capital, and the subscript t+1 denotes the time when capital
will be used. The dividends …rms distribute to their owners (households) are given by
_
¦
f
t =
_
P tYt ¡ (
_
W tHt +
_
P tQtZ
d
t )¡ (Rt ¡ 1)
_
B
d
t :
Firms maximize their shareholders’ utility. Since pro…ts are distributed at the end of the
period, a …rm values one more dollar in dividends at time t; by how much consumption marginal
utility households obtain at time t+ 1; by refusing this time t dollar. Thus …rms maximize
E0
1X
t=0
£t+1
_
¦
f
t ; (10)
where £t+1 denotes the relative marginal utility the household obtains from an additional unit
of consumption at time t+ 1,
£t+1 = ¡¯
t+1UL;t+1
¹Wt+1
: (11)
Maximizing (10) subject to equation (8), the optimal input demands made by …rms are
obtained. The representative …rm demands labor and capital, respectively, according to
_
W t
_
P t
=
®hYt
HtRt
; (12)
RtEt (£t+1) = ¯Et
(
£t+2
_
P t+1
_
P t
Qt+1
Qt
·
Rt+1(1¡ ±) + ®kYt+1
Kt+1Qt+1
¸)
: (13)
Note that all decisions made by …rms, unlike households’ deposit choice, are based on the
complete information set at t. Labor demand (12) is a¤ected by the interest rate since it is paid
in advance. Capital demand (13) depends on expected in‡ation, on the price of capital, Qt; and
on the nominal interest rate, everything discounted by the marginal disutility of labor (11). The
left-hand side of equation (13) is the loss in utility a household bears at time t+ 1 if dividends
are reduced by one unit at time t to buy more capital. This is equated to the value of the extra
dividend at time t+ 1; which can be spent at time t+ 2:
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2.3 The …nancial intermediary
Banks in this economy act as …nancial intermediaries between households and …rms. The rep-
resentative bank collects deposits from households,
_
Dt; plus any injection of new cash from the
central bank,
_
Xt; and uses these funds to make loans
_
B
d
t to …rms. At the end of the period, the
…nancial intermediary receives principal plus interest from the loans, Rt
_
B
d
t ; and it pays back
principal plus interest due on households’ deposits, Rt
_
Dt: Implicitly, the fact that the interest
rate paid to depositors is the same as that paid by borrowers means that banks act in a compet-
itive market for state-contingent loans (that is, Rt is contingent on time t information). Pro…ts
of the …nancial intermediary are thus
_
¦
fi
t = Rt
_
Xt: (14)
These pro…ts are distributed to households at the end of the period, as seen in (3).
2.4 Entrepreneurs
Capital is produced by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are risk-neutral, live only one period, and
can each carry out one project that requires one unit of consumption goods. The entrepreneur
operates a technology that transforms this unit of consumption goods into
»
!t units of capital
goods. The variable
»
!t is an idiosyncratic shock uniformly distributed in the non-negative
interval [1¡ !; 1 + !] ; with density Á(»!t) and distribution function ©(»!t).
Every period, after production takes place, part of the output Yt is transferred lump-sum to
entrepreneurs; this constitutes their net worth NWt. According to the data, NWt is positively
related with output, and more volatile than output; the elasticity of net worth with respect to
output will be called ».2 Net worth will also be a¤ected by a shock Zt which captures other
factors (e.g. changes in taxes or in market power) a¤ecting …rms’ cash positions, so I assume
NWt = ZtY »t .
2This assumption is a reduced form way to deal with the fact that in good times investors end up with more
cash available than in bad times. This could also be done through a dynamic problem for entrepreneurs, where
net worth would be another state variable of the system, possibly di¤erent among entrepreneurs, but this di¢cult
extension is left for future research.
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To generate …nancial frictions, it is assumed that this net worth is insu¢cient for the en-
trepreneur’s project. Moreover, since entrepreneurs live for only one period they cannot accu-
mulate wealth.3 Therefore, they need to borrow the di¤erence between their required investment
and their endowment, 1 ¡NWt: Firms are assumed to lend to entrepreneurs in a competitive
market, and to be able to deal with a su¢cient number of entrepreneurs in order to pool their
idiosyncratic risk. In other words, …rms can set up a “mutual fund” to lend to entrepreneurs.
The relationship between entrepreneurs and the mutual fund is a¤ected by asymmetric in-
formation. When they sign their contract, neither the lender nor entrepreneurs can observe
the idiosyncratic shock. Afterwards,
»
!t is revealed to the entrepreneurs, but the lender cannot
observe this outcome unless he monitors. Monitoring costs are a …xed proportion ¹c > 0 of the
capital produced. Thus capital production involves a costly state veri…cation problem, which
is optimally solved by a standard debt contract, according to Townsend (1979), and Gale and
Hellwig (1985). In this debt contract, an entrepreneur who borrows (1 ¡ NWt) consumption
goods agrees to repay Rkt (1 ¡ NWt) units of capital, if the realization of
»
!t is good. If the
realization of
»
!t is bad, then the entrepreneur prefers to default. Thus the default decision is
determined by a threshold value
_
!t which satis…es
_
!t ´ Rkt (1¡NWt): (15)
In the optimal contract, the lender monitors in case of default, and con…scates all the en-
trepreneur’s production, but nothing more. That is, entrepreneurs have limited liability.
To ensure that this debt contract is e¢cient and incentive compatible, the participation of
lenders must be guaranteed. The mutual fund will …nd it pro…table to lend the entrepreneurs
as long as the expected return net of monitoring costs (at least) equals the amount lent:
1¡NWt = Qt
(Z _!t
1¡!
»
!t©(d
»
!t)¡©(
_
!t)¹c + [1¡©(
_
!t)]
_
!t
)
´ Qtg(
_
!t): (16)
Here the left hand side denotes the amount borrowed by entrepreneurs, and the right hand side
re‡ects the expected return on this loan, net of monitoring costs.4
3The transfer they receive is taxed away when entrepreneurs die, i.e. at the end of the period, and then
returned lump sum to consumers.
4Credit rationing issues are avoided in this setup since expected returns going to the mutual fund are increasing
in the threshold value
_
!t: For more details on this see Bernanke et al. (2000).
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Also, participation of the entrepreneur in the contract must be assured. This means that his
expected payo¤ must (at least) equal the net worth he invests in the project:
Qt
½Z 1+!
_
!t
»
!t©(d
»
!t)¡ [1¡©(
_
!t)]
_
!t
¾
´ Qtf(
_
!t) = NWt; (17)
where the left hand side denotes the entrepreneur’s expected payo¤. This expected value includes
expected production of capital, minus what must be paid back on the loan, both conditional on
not defaulting.
This costly state veri…cation problem is solved taking as given the sequence of variables
fNWt;Qt; Rkt g1t=0: From equations (16) and (17) above, it follows that
Qt =
1
[E~!t ¡©(
_
!t)¹c]
=
1
[1¡©(_!t)¹c]
: (18)
Additionally, note that
f(
_
!t) + g(
_
!t) = 1¡©(
_
!t)¹c;
that is, if monitoring costs are positive, ¹c > 0; part of the output is destroyed by these costs,
©(
_
!t)¹c, while the rest is divided between the entrepreneur, f(
_
!t), and the lender, g(
_
!t). The
number of projects undertaken, it; net of monitoring costs, constitutes the supply of capital:
Zst = it[1¡©(
_
!t)¹c]:
2.5 The …scal authority
There is a government in this economy which consumes an amountGt: This government spending
is …nanced by lump sum taxes levied from households, Tt: In this economy government spending
is random and ‡uctuates according to
Gt+1 = exp("g;t+1)G
½g
t ; (19)
with 0 < ½g < 1; and "g;t+1 is an i.i.d. normal shock with zero mean and standard deviation ¾
"
g:
It is assumed that the …scal authority maintains a balanced budget every period, that is,
Gt = Tt; for 8t:
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2.6 The monetary authority
In this model, the central bank is in charge of monetary policy. I will study the stabilization
properties of two alternative monetary regimes. First, I take a constant money growth rule as
the benchmark. In this case, money supply is perfectly inelastic, and it is the nominal interest
rate that must adjust after any shock. Second, I will consider the e¤ects of using a Taylor rule,
in which the nominal interest rate depends on its lagged value, and on deviations of GDP from
its trend and of in‡ation from its target level. In this case, the central bank tunes the money
supply to achieve the desired nominal interest rate. Thus the nominal interest rate will be
rt = ° + °rrt¡1 + (1¡ °r)(~°¼¼t + ~°yyt) ´ ° + °rrt¡1 + °¼¼t + °yyt; (20)
where rt denotes the annualized quarterly interest rate, 4(Rt ¡ 1); ° is the long run value for rt
under no disturbances; ¼t ´ logPt¡ logPt¡1 is the in‡ation rate; and yt denotes the deviation of
output from steady state. Thus, the central bank cares about smoothing interest rates (°r > 0),
and both in‡ation and output stabilization (°¼; °y > 0).
In his original study, Taylor (1993) estimated the following coe¢cients: °r = 0; ~°¼ = 1:5;
and ~°y = 1: However, this parameterization results in indeterminacy in a limited participation
model (Christiano and Gust (1999)), as is also the case here after allowing for …nancial frictions.
Therefore, in the simulations below, a stable (determinate) version of this rule is employed.
3 Equilibrium
To analyze the general equilibrium, I detrend all nominal variables by dividing by beginning-of-
period monetary holdings,
_
M
s
t . I de…ne equilibrium in recursive form, omitting time subscripts
and using primes to denote the next period’s variables.
The timing can be summarized as follows:
Household’s
deposit choice
#
Shocks
are realized
#
All other variables
are chosen
#¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡!"
time t begins
"
time t+1 begins
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At the beginning of time t individuals take as given the current stocks of money and capital,
and know the past history of shocks. Given this information, they decide how much money to
put in the bank. After having chosen deposits, the current shocks are revealed. At this point,
the state of the economy is (S; s) with S = (M;K); and s = (a; z; g). All other variables are
chosen conditional on this state.
The model is solved by assuming the family structure explained in section 2, which allows
one to think of a representative agent for the whole economy. This representative agent has m
units of money balances, and k units of capital, let Si = (m; k) for the individual’s variables. The
individual state is thus given by the vector (Si; S; s): The Bellman equation of this representative
agent’s program is
V (Si; S; s) = max
D2[0;M ]
½
Et¡1
·
max
C;L;K0;H;Bd
U(C;L) + ¯V (S0i; S
0; s0)
¸¾
(21)
subject to
M ¡D +WL ¸ PC;
Bd ¸WH + PQZd;
M 0(1 + ¹) =M ¡D +WL¡ PC +RD +¦f +¦fi ¡ PT;
¦f = PY ¡ (WH + PQZd)¡ (R¡ 1)Bd;
¦fi = RX;
Y = AK®kH®h ;
Zd = K 0 ¡ (1¡ ±)K;
i[1¡©(_!)¹c] = Zs;
Q = 1
[1¡©(_!)¹c]
;
_
! ´ Rk(1¡NW );
NW = ZY »:
De…nition 1 A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium in this economy consists of a set
of functions (V; C; L, D; H; K0; Bd; M 0, P, R, Q, i;
_
!; NW, W, ¦f ; ¦fi) such that:
i) the value function V (Si; S; s) solves the representative agent’s Bellman equation (21), and
C(Si; S; s); L(Si; S; s); D(Si; S; s¡1); K 0(Si; S; s); Bd(Si; S; s); H(Si; S; s); M 0(Si; S; s); ¦f (Si; S; s);
and ¦fi(Si; S; s) are the associated optimal policy functions, taking as given the appropriate
information structure,
ii) the functions i; and
_
! solve the entrepreneur’s problem given Rk; Q; and NW = ZY »,
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iii) the central bank sets interest rates according to the following rule:
r = ° + °rr¡1 + °¼¼ + °yy;
iv) and consumption goods, money, loan, labor, and capital goods markets clear, that is C + i+G = Y;
M = 1; D +X = Bd; H = L; G = T; k =K; m =M; and Zd = Zs:
Under certain restrictions, including su¢ciently tightly bounded shock processes, there will
exist an equilibrium in which both cash-in-advance constraints (2) and (8) will bind for each
state of the world. In such equilibria, the nominal interest rate will be positive, and there will
be a positive level of deposits. In the analysis below, I will focus on this type of equilibrium. I
solve the model using Campbell’s (1994) undetermined coe¢cients method.
4 Parameter values
The parameters of the model are ¯; µ; Ã; ª; ±; ®k, ®h, !; ¹c; »; as well as the parameters of
the stochastic processes for the shocks (½a; ½g; ½¹; ¾
"
a; ¾
"
º ; ¾
"
¹; and ¾
"
z ): I take some of these
parameters from previous business cycle literature and calibrate others to match some moments
of US data.
Given an average quarterly money growth rate of
_
X = 1:2%; the discount factor ¯ is 0:9926:
This implies an annual nominal interest rate equal to 7:8% at the non-stochastic steady state,
consistent with US data. The relative risk aversion parameter is set equal to µ = 2. The
parameter Ã takes the value 0:7; that is, the elasticity of labor supply with respect to real wages
is close to 1:5. This value lies within the range usually employed in macroeconomic studies. The
coe¢cient ª is normalized so that labor in the non-stochastic steady state equals one.
The depreciation rate, ±; is taken to be 2:4% per quarter. The capital share on aggregate
income, in the frictionless model is taken to be 0:36; this implies an ®k equal to 0:3598 in the
model with credit frictions. This value takes into account that aggregate output, Y A; equals
output plus value added from the capital sector, Y + i[Q¡ 1]: Notice that in the case without
monitoring costs, the price of capital is one, Q = 1; and therefore, Y A = Y: Constant returns
to scale in the production function imply ®h = 0:6402. The ratio of government spending over
output is taken from US data and equal to 0.21.
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Gertler (1995) assigns » a value of 4:45: I obtain an elasticity of pro…ts (net worth) with
respect to output5 equal to 3:84. I calibrate Rk to match a risk premium of 191 basis points
measured by the spread between the bank prime rate and the three-month commercial paper
rate on average terms. The bound ! on the support of the uniform distribution of ~!t is chosen to
match an annual bankruptcy rate, ©(
_
!t); of 10% for US data from 1980-2001.6 The proportion of
internal project …nancing, NW; is set equal to 0.15 as in Gertler (1995). The value of monitoring
costs, ¹c; is set equal 20% as in Fuerst (1995). This calibration implies a threshold value, ¹! of
0:8619.
Both technology shocks and government spending are found in the data to be highly per-
sistent (King and Rebelo (2000), Ireland (2001), McGrattan (1994)). Therefore, I set both ½a
and ½g equal to 0:95: Money supply shocks are assumed to have a correlation ½¹ equal to 0.3
(Fuerst (1995)). Shocks to net worth are considered to be nonautocorrelated, that is, ½z is 0:
The standard deviations for the shocks are simultaneously calibrated to match the nine second
moments in the data showed in Table 1: The standard deviations of government spending shocks
and net worth shocks are tightly restricted by the moments ¾g=¾y and ½(y; rp); and the other
two parameters are identi…ed jointly by the remaining seven moments. The resulting values are
¾"a = 0:0005; ¾
"
g = 0:0032; ¾
"
¹ = 0:0009; and ¾
"
z = 0:0011:
When the Taylor rule is at work, I consider a version with the following coe¢cients: °r = 0:56;
~°¼ = 1:61; and ~°y = 0:36. This rule is denoted as stable in the terminology of Christiano and
Gust (1999) when applied to a limited participation model, in the sense that it determines a
stable unique equilibrium.7 These weights are close to those in Christiano and Gust (1999),
but have been adjusted so that they come close to achieving an optimal response to technology
shocks. As usual, I follow the general consensus in giving a higher weight to in‡ation smoothing
rather than to output stabilization.
Below, I will denote the model without frictions the symmetric information model, ¹c = 0,
and the case with frictions the asymmetric information model, ¹c > 0 (SI and AI, respectively).
5Taking data on corporate pro…ts after tax and US GDP for the period 1947:1-2002:1.
6US Business Bankruptcy Filings over Total Filings 1980-2001. Source: ABI World. This value is similar to
the ones provided by Gertler (1995) and Fisher (1999).
7As usual when dealing with interest rate rules, issues regarding indeterminacy of equilibrium arise. I …nd
regions of determinacy and indeterminacy for this model similar to those obtained by Christiano and Gust (1999).
The Taylor coe¢cients considered here lie in the area of unique equilibrium.
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Notice that when monitoring costs are zero, the model collapses to a standard limited partici-
pation framework.
5 E¤ects of credit market imperfections
In this section, I study the behavior of the model with credit market imperfections, comparing it
to the standard frictionless model. First, I establish that both models (SI and AI) are capable of
addressing some of the standard stylized facts considered in the business cycle literature. Next,
I analyze the reactions of the two economies to technology and demand shocks.
5.1 Second moments properties
Table 1 presents some key moment relationships implied by the SI and AI models, and compares
them with US data. The series have been taken from the FRED Database (Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis) and correspond to Real GNP, Real Personal Consumption Expenditure, Real Gross
Private Domestic Investment, Real Government Consumption Expenditures & Gross Investment,
and Nonfarm Payroll Employment, from 1970:1 to 2000:4, in logarithms and detrended using the
Hodrick-Prescott …lter. The risk premium is measured as the spread between the Bank Prime
rate and the Three-month commercial paper rate.
Table 1 reports nine moments matched by choosing the four standard deviations of the
shocks. It is observed that consumption is roughly as volatile as output in the two models,
and investment is much more volatile than output in both settings, while the relative standard
deviation of labor with respect to output is somewhat higher than what is observed in the data.
Both models match the standard deviation of government spending, and report correlations
among output, labor and investment moderately lower than those in the data. The AI model is,
by construction, able to account for the negative correlation between the growth rate of output
and the risk premium. Finally, the correlation of prices and interest rates is closer to the data
in the AI than in the SI model.
In summary, the models analyzed in this paper display reasonable second moment properties
which are quite similar to each other, except that the AI version helps understand the movements
in the risk premium, a fact missing in the SI case.
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5.2 Impulse response functions
Next, I ask what credit market imperfections add to the dynamics of the model. To isolate
the e¤ects of credit market imperfections, I assume the central bank follows a constant money
growth rule, leaving the analysis of interest rate rules for later. Results are stated in percentage
deviations from their steady states values.
5.2.1 Credit market imperfections and shocks to technology
Figure 2 reports the impulse response functions of the models with (dashed line) and without
(solid line) credit market imperfections to a 1% technology shock at time one, "a;1 = 0:01;
assuming that monetary policy follows a constant money growth rule.
In the benchmark case (SI), a positive technology shock makes inputs more productive. Out-
put and investment increase and prices fall, enhancing demand for cash inputs. Since monitoring
costs are zero in this framework, capital goods are elastically supplied at the price Qt = 1:
With credit market imperfections, the initial response of output and investment to the same
shock is not only ampli…ed but also more persistent than in the frictionless case. The ampli…-
cation of investment is especially strong; it rises about 30% more than in the benchmark case.
Higher productivity increases entrepreneurs’ net worth through the increase in output. Since
entrepreneurs become richer, they need to borrow less, which lightens the monitoring cost prob-
lem, re‡ected in the fall of the risk premium and of the price of capital,8 an e¤ect absent in the
SI setting. This positive feedback in output and investment makes output increase more and
prices fall more than in the SI model. Meanwhile, consumption goods are substituted by invest-
ment goods as they become relatively less expensive. This explains the weaker initial reaction
of consumption in the AI model, though consumption eventually rises more than in the SI case
as capital grows.
8The overall e¤ect on the price of capital is in general ambiguous: in addition to the increased investment
supply, the positive technology shock also favors the demand for capital. In this model the price of capital falls,
reducing marginal costs of …rms.
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5.2.2 Credit market imperfections and shocks to demand
Figure 3 displays the response of the economy with and without …nancial imperfections to a
1% government spending shock at time one, "g;1 = 0:01; when the monetary authority follows a
constant money growth rule.
In the standard limited participation model (SI), the rise in government spending induces a
rise in output, labor and in prices, while consumption and investment fall. Higher expected taxes
imply a negative wealth e¤ect that diminishes consumption and motivates greater labor supply.
Regarding the fall in investment, there is no clear theoretical consensus on the e¤ects of changes
in government spending: the overall reaction of investment depends both on the persistence of
the shock and the elasticity of labor supply.9 In this model, persistence of ½g = 0:95 is not high
enough to make investment rise.
In the AI model, …nancial frictions induce a larger increase in output through the rise in
entrepreneurs’ net worth. This e¤ect, together with the fall in the price of capital, alleviates the
fall in investment, while aggravating the reduction of consumption. But notice that in contrast
to the case of technology shocks, output and prices now go in the same direction. Thus, positive
feedback in output in the AI model reduces the increase in prices after a government spending
shock, whereas the decrease in prices was reinforced in response to a technology shock. This
di¤erence in transmission of shocks to output and prices helps explain the stabilization e¤ects
of monetary policy analyzed in the next section.
6 Stabilization properties of the Taylor rule
The next step is to study the stabilization properties of an interest rate rule, as compared with
a constant money growth rule, with and without credit market imperfections.
6.1 A shock to technology
Figure 4 reports impulse response functions under a constant money growth rule (solid line),
compared with the responses under a stable version (20) of the traditional Taylor rule (dash-
dotted line), for the SI model; Figure 5 shows the same impulse responses for the AI model. In
both cases, I implement a one percent technology shock at time t = 1:
9See Baxter and King (1993), and Fatás and Mihov (2001).
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A Taylor rule reduces the response of output to the shock in both cases, with a stronger
e¤ect when there are credit market imperfections. In‡ation is very substantially stabilized by
the interest rate rule, and the presence of credit market imperfections is irrelevant regarding
in‡ation stabilization.
The stabilization of output and in‡ation by the interest rate rule occurs because the monetary
authority reacts to the rise in output and the fall in prices by increasing the interest rate. Both
productive inputs are cash goods, which means that higher interest rates act like a tax on input
demands, raising marginal costs and partially o¤setting the expansion induced by the shock.
This cost e¤ect is strengthened in the model with imperfections. There, stabilizing output by
raising interest rates is translated into a lower growth of entrepreneurial net worth, further
braking output growth, so the stabilizing e¤ect of the Taylor rule is reinforced by …nancial
frictions. Thus, under ‡exible prices, and in contrast with a sticky price setup, an interest rate
rule reduces both in‡ation and output variability after technology disturbances. This result
is novel in this type of analysis. As mentioned in the introduction, the conventional wisdom
associated with sticky price models is that interest rate rules stabilize the economy facing demand
shocks, whereas for supply shocks, a tradeo¤ between output and in‡ation stabilization arises.
6.2 A shock to demand
The demand shock is a 1% rise in government spending at time t = 1: The dynamics of the
traditional Taylor rule versus the constant money growth rule for the SI and AI models are
displayed in Figures 6 and 7, respectively.
Under the Taylor rule, the initial rise in output is strongly damped by the reaction of the
interest rate to rising in‡ation. Thereafter, output rises but less than under a constant money
growth rule. Thus, as before, output is stabilized under the rule and the e¤ects are stronger in
the AI model. However, prices are now destabilized in both SI and AI models. In other words,
in response to a demand shock the use of interest rate rules involves a tradeo¤ between output
and in‡ation stabilization.
This con…rms the fact that a Taylor rule has the opposite stabilizing e¤ects in a ‡exible price
setting compared to a sticky price model. Using an interest rate rule in response to a demand
shock stabilizes output but at the cost of destabilizing in‡ation.
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6.3 Some welfare implications
While this paper focuses primarily on the stabilization properties of interest rate rules, it is
obviously also important to ask whether stabilization is desirable. Although computing the
optimal rule is beyond the scope of this paper, this impulse response analysis allows for some
simple but interesting conclusions about welfare.
Some intuition can be obtained by comparing the two models in this paper with a stan-
dard real business cycle model. The RBC model calculated here uses the same technology
and preferences as this limited participation model, but eliminates all frictions, including the
cash-in-advance constraint. Thus we can measure deviations from optimality on the real side
by comparing the responses to a 1% technology and government spending shocks in this RBC
model to those in the SI and AI models under the two policy regimes.
Figure 8 plots the results for output. I …nd that a constant money growth rule keeps the
SI model close to the “frictionless” case, whereas the use of a “stabilizing” interest rate rule
stabilizes too much, driving output further away from the “frictionless” model. However, with
…nancial frictions the same interest rate rule brings output close to that of the RBC model, re-
ducing the excessive ‡uctuation caused by the credit market imperfections. Similar calculations
for consumption and labor supply con…rm that there is a welfare improvement on the real side
from following an interest rate rule in the AI case but not in the SI case.
This shows that there may be room for interest rate rules to smooth the excessive ‡uctuation
caused by failures in credit markets. While the RBC comparison only reveals losses on the real
side of the model, I have shown that a Taylor rule which stabilizes output after a technology
shock also stabilizes in‡ation. On the other hand, whether it is good to use a Taylor rule in
response to a demand shock is ambiguous due to the tradeo¤ between output and in‡ation
stabilization.
7 Conclusions and further research
This paper analyzes the performance of interest rate rules in the presence of credit market
imperfections. In this limited participation economy, a stable version of the Taylor rule similar
to the one employed by Christiano and Gust (1999) stabilizes both output and in‡ation after
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a technology shock, whereas an output-in‡ation tradeo¤ arises for a demand shock. Both the
stabilizing and destabilizing e¤ects of the rule are ampli…ed by the presence of …nancial frictions.
Contrary to the common intuition that technology-driven ‡uctuations are optimal, I …nd
that under credit market imperfections the stabilization of technology shocks by means of a
Taylor rule can improve welfare. However, whether or not a Taylor rule is optimal overall will
depend on whether supply or demand shocks are the dominant source of ‡uctuations in the
economy.
This analysis could be extended to derive the optimal monetary policy rule in a scenario of
…nancial frictions. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) show how this can be done in a sticky price
model without …nancial frictions. It seems interesting to see how Rotemberg and Woodford’s
results would change in a limited participation model with …nancial frictions. Finally, considering
the model studied here, it seems that monetary policy performance might be improved if some
indicator of credit market imperfections, like the risk premium or the bankruptcy rate, were
included in the interest rate rule. These issues are left for future research.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary statistics
A.- Relative standard deviations with respect to output
Sample Data SI AI
(1970:1-2000:4) Model Model
Consumption 0.83 1.09 1.20
Investment 4.55 4.55 4.94
Labor 0.96 1.48 1.52
Government spending 0.41 0.41 0.41
B.- Correlations
corr(output,labor) 0.85 0.70 0.66
corr(output,investment) 0.91 0.69 0.65
corr(investment,labor) 0.74 0.63 0.60
corr(output,risk premium) -0.33 0 -0.33
corr(prices,int. rate) 0.22 0.10 0.26
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72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96
Figure 1: Real US GNP versus the spread between the Bank Prime rate and the Three-month
commercial paper rate.
In the …gure, the solid line denotes the real GNP, whereas the dashed line refers to the spread
between the Bank Prime rate and the Three-month commercial paper rate. Source: Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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Figure 2: Technology shock under constant money growth rule.
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Figure 3: Government spending shock under constant money growth rule.
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Figure 4: Technology shock in the symmetric information model.
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Figure 5: Technology shock in the asymmetric information model.
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Figure 6: Government spending shock in the symmetric information model.
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Figure 7: Government spending shock in the asymmetric information model.
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Figure 8: Stabilization properties of the interest rate rule under technology and
government spending shocks.
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